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Introduction  
Trade relations between the United States and the Latin American and 
Caribbean region are in a period of uncertain transitio . For over a decade 
those relations were formally structured around the expectation that the 
parties would establish a comprehensive Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA), embracing all countries in the region except for Cuba. Those 
regional talks formed part of an implicit hierarchy of trade negotiations, 
situated between a series of bilateral and subregional free trade agreements 
(FTAs) that the United States pursued with many of its Latin American 
partners and the multilateral negotiations in the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Over the past several years, 
however, these plans have all hit obstacles. The FTAA negotiations 
languished for years until they were formally (if quietly) terminated in 2008; 
the most recent FTAs reached between the United States and Latin American 
partners have faced heightened opposition in the United States Congress; and 
the DDA negotiations are currently stalled, almost eight years after their 
launch. 
Two concurrent developments in late 2008 will significantly 
influence the future course of inter-American trade relations. One of 
these was the outbreak of the first truly global recession since the Second 
World War, which has had a major negative impact on w rld trade and 
also specifically on trade between the region and the United States. This 
was shortly followed by another major change: the election of Senator 
Barack Obama to serve as the forty-fourth President of the United States, 
which was accompanied by an expansion of the majorities held by the 
Democratic Party in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Both 
of these developments raised concerns in some quarters about a re-
emergence of protectionism in the United States, baed on the notion that 
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economic downturns tend to make governments more introspective,  
and 
the fact that the Democrats in the United States ar generally perceived to be less supportive of trade 
liberalization than the Republicans. 
It is argued here that there has so far been relativ y little demand in the United States for 
"traditional" protection (through border measures affecting goods) in reaction to the current crisis. 
There have nevertheless been a handful of concessions made to traditional protectionist demands, as 
well as an emphasis on trade-related measures and policies. The most important include the "Buy 
American" provisions in the economic stimulus package enacted in February 2009; discontinuation of 
the programme that had allowed limited access to the United States market for Mexican trucking firms; 
massive subsidies granted to automotive and financial service firms in the context of bailout 
programmes; and the reintroduction of export subsidie  for dairy products. Additionally, both the 
expected health-care reform initiative and the draft legislation on climate change currently being 
considered by Congress could lead to fees being imposed on imports or the implementation of other 
measures affecting foreign providers of goods, servic s or capital. 
The purpose of this study is to review the current sta us and future prospects for trade relations 
between the United States and the Latin American and Caribbean region. It does so by examining the 
trade-policymaking environment in the United States, and then reviewing pending and potential 
initiatives that might directly or indirectly affect the trade interests of the region. The study notes that 
trade policy has had a relatively low profile in the first months of the Obama administration, and the 
administration is unlikely to devote significant and sustained attention to this topic until other, more 
pressing matters have been addressed. However, it is expected to take action in the near future on 
specific trade initiatives in the light of some legacy agreements and impending deadlines. This thesis 
can be divided into four subsidiary points. 
The first is that the new administration has so far given trade policy a relatively low priority. On 
the one hand, it has tried to restrain efforts in Congress to enact measures that violate trade agreements, 
and it can be expected to file formal complaints with WTO against trading partners that do not show 
similar restraint. On the other hand, it has thus far devoted limited political capital to efforts to approve 
the trade agreements it has inherited, complete the Doha Round and obtain a new grant of negotiating 
authority from Congress. The administration is more concerned at present with stimulating the 
economy and addressing social and environmental issues that, from the Democrats' point of view, 
received too little consideration in the eight years of the previous administration. 
This leads to the second point: while trade policy per se may receive little attention, the priority 
areas of this administration may give rise to initiat ves that have important if indirect consequences for 
trade. Those initiatives may produce opportunities for protectionist interests in the United States to 
legislate rules that favour domestic over foreign suppliers of goods and services. The recent 
controversy over the "Buy American" provisions in the economic stimulus bill have already 
demonstrated how protectionist interests might exploit the opportunities that arise, but they also 
showed that the Obama administration can act to restrain these impulses. It is anticipated that there 
may be several more episodes of this sort as the administration and Congress work on such diverse 
issues as climate change, health care, consumer safty, workers' rights, and port security — each of 
which has the potential to erect new barriers to trade or to establish rules and incentives that 
discriminate in favour of domestic producers and servic  providers. Trade-related issues may thus 
prove to be more significant in the coming months and years than traditional trade policy. 
Third, despite the generally low priority accorded thus far to trade, there are a number of legacy 
agreements and programmes inherited from the previous administration that the current one will have to 
address during its first year in office. These include, inter alia, the outstanding FTAs with Colombia, P nama, 
and the Republic of Korea, as well as the pending expiration of both the Andean Trade Preferences Act 
(ATPA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). These initiatives are complicated by the politica  
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issues with which they are associated, but the signs are that the administration will not repudiate any of these 
inherited challenges. The Colombia FTA will likely prove to be the hardest to resolve because it faces 
substantial opposition from labour unions and members of the President's own party. 
Fourth, there are two major issues for which the administration has yet to announce its objectives 
and timetable. Action on these matters, when it comes, will signal that the status of trade policy hasbeen 
elevated. One is DDA, and the other is Trade Promotion Authority (TPA). On the former, the Obama 
administration has so far been clear on only two points. One is that it does favour completion of the talks, 
and the other is that, like its predecessor, this administration expects "advanced developing countries" such 
as Brazil, China and India, to make deeper commitmen s than they have signalled thus far. The 
administration has yet to make any specific proposals for moving the stalled talks forward; any such 
proposals are expected to emerge as a result of an inter al review process under way at the time of 
writing. 
Closely related to the DDA negotiations is the issue of renewal of the president's negotiating 
authority. The last TPA grant expired in mid-2007 and it is doubtful that United States' negotiating 
partners in DDA would be willing to conclude a deal unless the United States side has a new grant of 
authority in hand. It is doubtful whether the campaign to secure such a grant will start before the 2010, 
and it is unclear how strong the push will be when it finally comes. 
Building upon these main points, this chapter also reviews the status and prospects for several 
other matters affecting trade relations between the United States and the region. These include both 
traditional trade policy and the expanding range of trade-related issues. On the traditional side, the 
chapter examines the various ways that Latin American and Caribbean countries, especially those that 
do not yet have FTAs with the United States, may pursue the reduction or removal of the remaining 
barriers faced by their exports to the United States. At the world level, the main tasks are to obtain a 
new grant of negotiating authority from Congress, complete the Doha Round, and renew GSP. At the 
regional level, this means securing the reauthorization of expiring preferences for Andean and 
Caribbean Basin countries and winning congressional approval for the FTAs with Colombia and 
Panama. While the Obama administration has indicated its interest in all of these initiatives, it had not 
yet announced precise plans for any of them at the im  of writing. There are also moves under way to 
ease the restrictions on trade and travel with Cuba, with some action already taken but the main barriers 
still remaining in place.  
The chapter concludes with some observations on the current state and prospects of inter-
American cooperation. It is suggested that the failure of the FTAA negotiations need not undermine 
cooperation on the many economic, social, and security issues on which the United States and the 
region share common interests, including trade. 
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I. The United States trade 
policymaking environment 
How will United States trade policy in general, and i itiatives towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean in particular, be aff cted by the major 
economic and political changes that came at the end of 2008? The evidence 
so far suggests that the Obama administration is generally in favour of free 
trade, but also that it appears to place a lower prio ity on this issue than on 
others in the current circumstances. In other words, trade policy is not as 
immediate a problem as restarting the economy. Nor, so far, has it received 
the same attention as new programmes in social, environmental and foreign 
policy. As a result, there are no clear signals yet from the administration on 
the conclusion of existing negotiations, the ratificat on of those already 
concluded or the initiation of new ones. 
A. Trends in United States trade with Latin 
America and the Caribbean 
The economic crisis took a toll on trade between the United States and the 
Latin American and Caribbean region. 
What effect has the recession had on the United States' trade with 
the region and the rest of the world? It is possible to get a sense of the 
scale of the downturn by comparing the data in figures 1 and 2. The 
annual data in figure 1 appear to show that United States imports from 
the region and elsewhere in 2008 grew at about the same pace as they 
have since the recovery from the lows of 2001-2002. Nonetheless, those 
numbers hide the fact that imports started to declin  after July 2008 and 
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tumbled much more rapidly after October. Comparing the first halves 
of  
2008 and 2009, total United States imports fell by 31.9%, and imports from Latin America and the 
Caribbean shrank by an almost identical factor (31.7%)  The data in figure 2 show that these declines 
hit the United States' trading partners in all parts of the world. 
FIGURE 1 
UNITED STATES: ANNUAL WORLDWIDE IMPORTS, 2000-2008 
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UNITED STATES: MONTHLY WORLDWIDE IMPORTS 2008-2009 
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Among Latin American and Caribbean exports to the United States, iron and steel and 
automobiles have suffered the most. Export volumes have risen for some commodities, such as copper, 
but the positive effect on values has been offset by plummeting prices. 
The consequences for specific countries depend partly upon the composition of their exports. 
Some commodities have seen steep price falls which have accelerated the impact of faltering demand. 
That is especially notable in the case of oil, gas and their derivatives, which in 2008 accounted for 
30.5% of all United States imports from the region. The volume of United States imports of crude oil 
from all sources fell by just 1.4% between the first quarter of 2008 and the same period in 2009; but 
the average price paid per barrel of oil plummeted from US$ 86 to US$ 41 — a 52.4% drop. The net 
result was that the total value of United States crude oil imports from the world in the first quarter of 
2009 was down by 53.0%, and imports from Mexico, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Trinidad 
and Tobago and other regional suppliers shrank by 47.1%.  
Copper prices affected exports even more dramatically. While the volume of copper imported 
from the region in the first quarter of 2009 was actu lly 73.4% higher than in the same period of 2008, 
unit prices fell by more than half (55.9%); the netr sult was a 23.6% decline in the value of United 
States copper imports from Chile, Peru and other suppliers in the region. Producers of some traditional 
agricultural products fared better, however. The value of United States coffee imports from Latin 
America and the Caribbean was down by just 11.1% owing to modest reductions in both unit prices 
(6.7%) and volumes (4.8%). Banana exporters enjoyed a rise in unit prices (18.5%) that more than 
offset slightly smaller volumes (2.7%), resulting i a net increase of 15.3% in value terms. First-quarter 
United States imports from Latin America and the Caribbean were up in a few other industries, such as 
computers (11.2%) and nonferrous metals (12.8%); but these could not make up for the sharp fall in 
imports of such goods as telephone apparatus (23.7%), iron and steel (32.0%) and automobiles 
(53.2%).1  
There have been similar trends on the other side of the trade balance: the United States' first-
quarter worldwide exports were down by 23.2%, and sales to the region fell 21.5%. While exports to 
the region were up in a few areas such as pharmaceuticals and medical products, they dropped sharply 
for such diverse products as wheat (50.2% below first-quarter 2008 levels), refined petroleum products 
(50.3%), fertilizers (56.0%) and automobiles (59.8%). 
Overall, United States imports have fallen more steeply than exports, thus producing an 
improvement in the trade balance. That may be one reason why there has so far been relatively little 
protectionist pressure in United States policymaking bodies, as discussed below. In the first quarter of 
2009 the country's global trade deficit was US$ 133.0 billion, or 37.6% less than in the first quarter of 
2008 (US$ 213.2 billion). The deficit with Latin America and the Caribbean narrowed from US$ 29.0 
billion to US$ 15.5 billion (46.3%). Nearly half (46.1%) of the improvement in the global United 
States trade balance, and an even larger share (71.2%) for trade with Latin America and the Caribbean, 
can be attributed to the price-driven reductions in the deficits on oil and gas. 
B. The priorities of the Obama administration 
Faced with domestic challenges such as setting the economy on a sounder footing and addressing social 
and environmental concerns, the Obama administration has afforded relatively little priority to trade 
policy. 
While the economic policymakers in the executive branch acknowledge that open markets do 
contribute to a productive economy, they are also aware that it takes years to negotiate, approve, 
implement, and reap the benefits of new agreements. That fact, plus the more urgent domestic priorities 
                                                   
1 Unless otherwise stated, all trade data cited in this report are calculated from the United States International Trade Commission's 
DataWeb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/). 
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associated with the current crisis, coupled with a wish to avoid differences within the Democratic 
Party, have made the administration reluctant to place much emphasis on trade up to now. Its 
immediate objectives appear instead to be promoting economic recovery while also advancing 
Democratic goals in social and environmental policies. Trade policy is seen as a vehicle for advancing 
those goals; for example, the priorities listed in the 2009 Trade Policy Agenda include "make trade an 
important policy tool for achieving progress on national energy and environmental goals."2 
While the administration has placed trade policy relatively low on its agenda, there are some 
indications that the groundwork is slowly being laid for a more direct approach to the topic. 
Momentum is not very strong, however, and it is unclear whether a new initiative will be forthcoming 
in 2009 or will be postponed until 2010. Moreover, it may be difficult to sustain any new push without 
evidence of real progress towards completion of the Doha Round. The Obama administration has yet to 
make specific public proposals for the pending trade greements it inherited and for the Doha Round 
negotiations. Moreover, as is discussed elsewhere, such progress may be all the more difficult to 
achieve while the negotiators in Geneva doubt that the United States is prepared to make the first move 
by securing a new grant of trade promotion authority f om Congress. 
C. Dealing with Congress 
No matter what the administration's priorities may be, it can accomplish little on trade policy without 
the support of Congress. The Constitution makes the regulation of commerce a congressional 
prerogative. Since the mid-1930s the legislature has periodically delegated authority in this field to the 
executive, but those grants of authority have never been absolute or permanent. Even when the two 
branches of government are unified, which has been th  exception rather than the rule in recent 
decades,3 there is no guarantee that the legislative branch will readily grant the wishes of the executive. 
While unified government does make it easier for the two branches to cooperate, presidents tend to find 
Congress a partner that must be persuaded. 
1. The democratic majorities in the House and Senat e may not 
be conducive to the passing of trade deals 
The fact that the Democratic Party now controls both chambers of Congress has raised some concerns 
in trade policy circles both in the United Sates and broad. It is frequently claimed that Democrats 
generally tend to have a more protectionist stance than Republicans in trade-related matters. While 
there may be some truth to that assertion, it glosses over two important qualifiers. One is that 
legislators in the United States tend to vote less sy tematically along party lines than in other countries, 
which means that individual legislators are free to decide how they vote on any given issue. The other 
is that few trade-related issues come down to a simple choice between free trade and protection. The 
net result is that Republicans may indeed tend to fav ur market-opening initiatives more often than 
Democrats, but the degree of partisan difference vari s, both by issue and from legislator to legislator. 
In the United States, the degree of partisanship tends to be positively correlated with the 
abstractness of the issue that is put to the vote. At one extreme are proposals that have clear and 
identifiable consequences for specific industries; these include such initiatives as the farm bills that 
Congress enacts about once every five years (legislation that inter alia sets the level of support for 
specific commodities) or proposals to extend import rotection to specific goods. These initiatives tend 
to be relatively non-partisan, with legislators' votes determined more by the composition of their 
constituencies than by party affiliations. At the other extreme are, for example, proposals to extend n w 
                                                   
2 Available on-line at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2009/2009_Trade_Policy_Agenda/Section_ 
index.html. 
3 Over the past four decades, there has been fully unified government (the White House and both chambers of Congress controlled by 
the same party) only one third of the time. 
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grants of negotiating authority to the president. For a number of reasons, Democrats are much more 
reluctant to support these delegations of authority than Republicans.  
The differences between the parties also relate to the types of trade agreements that are under 
consideration. Republicans tend to treat most trade agr ements the same, whereas the level of support 
among Democrats appears to be lower when the partners i  question are developing —and hence low-
wage— countries. While Democrats supported the multilateral trade agreements of the Tokyo (1979) 
and Uruguay (1994) Rounds in about the same proporti ns as Republicans, and many Democrats 
supported the FTAs with Canada (1988) and Australia (2004), they opposed most of the FTAs that the 
Bush administration negotiated with developing countries. Their opposition was especially sharp in the 
case of the FTA with Central America and the Dominica  Republic, which passed in 2004 by the 
narrowest possible margin, and the FTA with Colombia, for which House Democrats managed to 
withdraw TPA treatment in 2008. 
How will the Obama administration fare when it asks Congress to approve pending FTAs and 
make a new grant of negotiating authority? The raw numbers suggest that President Obama enjoys a 
higher level of partisan support in Congress than any of his predecessors in the past thirty years. That is 
particularly true in the Senate, where the Democrats have now attained the "filibuster-proof" level, 
holding 604 of the 100 seats (precisely the number of votes neded to deny the opposition the ability to 
defeat bills through a dilatory legislative manoeuvre). In the House of Representatives the Democratic 
majority holds 256 seats and the Republicans have 178 (with one vacancy). The advantage may be 
more theoretical than real, however, given that, first,  legislators do not necessarily vote along party 
lines and, second, there are several moderate legislators in both parties who continue to hold the 
balance of power. This point is even more important in the case of trade policy, where the White House 
cannot count on universal support from Democrats in Co gress. 
Given that a sizable number of Democratic legislators probably cannot be persuaded to vote for 
trade liberalization under most circumstances, significant initiatives in this field will require 
cooperation between moderates in both parties. Althoug  they are in the minority, Republicans will 
probably be asked to deliver the majority of the votes for the trade agreements that the administration 
may soon submit for approval, and may also have the power to decide whether President Obama 
receives a new grant of negotiating authority. 
D. Is a new period of protectionism imminent? 
There are pervasive fears today that countries may adopt protectionist actions that worsen and prolong 
the current economic crisis. Those worries are especially acute with regard to the United States, owing 
both to the size of its economy and to the apparent similarities between the present crisis and the Grat 
Depression of the 1930s. A number of articles and reports published since late 2008 have warned that 
protectionism is on the rise, citing such examples as increased use of antidumping measures in 
developing countries and the massive subsidy programmes in industrialized countries. Are these fears 
of resurgent protectionism justified? The evidence so far suggests that there has been relatively litte
demand for "traditional" protection (that is, through border measures). However, the outlook is 
different when the analysis extends to the broader category of trade-related measures, including 
subsidies and government procurement, among others.   
1. Despite the economic woes, there have been few c alls for 
protectionist measures in the United States 
One way of gauging the demand for protection is to review the number of cases filed under the trade-
remedy laws, and especially the antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws. In the first 
                                                   
4 Note that two of the senators who are counted as Democrats are independents who usually vote with the Democrats. 
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eight months of Fiscal 2009, which coincidentally began just after it became clear that the economy 
was in a recession (October 2008), there have been only 16 AD and CVD petitions filed by United 
States industries.5 At an annualized rate of 21.3 petitions, that is far less than the pattern maintained 
over the past 30 years, which shows an average of 47.9 cases filed per year in non-recession years, and 
80.6 cases in recession years.6 Moreover, there have been no safeguard cases sincethe Bush 
administration’s self-initiated steel case in 2001. The auto industry has not demanded import 
protection, although it has asked for massive financial support. 
What explains this relatively low level of demand for protection? One possible interpretation is 
that there is simply a lag between the onset of the rec ssion and the filing of new demands, which will 
therefore appear in the not-too-distant future. Alternatively, many analysts suggest that global supply 
chains have grown increasingly dependent on open markets, so there are fewer industries that can 
afford to demand protection (see for example Newfarmer and Gamberoni, 2009). That would certainly 
seem to be the case for the highly globalized auto industry. 
Whatever the reason for the reduced demand, a number of actions taken by the Obama 
administration do distort trade, or may do so. Most of hese concern trade-related measures rather than 
traditional trade policy, including the "Buy American" provisions in the economic stimulus package 
enacted in February; discontinuation of the programme that had allowed limited access to the United 
States market for Mexican trucking firms; the granting of massive subsidies to automotive and financial 
services firms in the context of bailout programmes; and the reintroduction of export subsidies for dai y 
products.  
Even if there were a strong push for "traditional" protection in the United States, there are limits 
to how far it could legally go. Nearly all United States tariffs are bound in WTO, many of them at zero 
percent, and several partners have FTAs that guarantee their duty-free access to the United States 
market. However, there are fewer constraints (either multilateral or through FTAs) on the use of 
broader trade-related policies, such as subsidies (both industrial and agricultural) and government 
procurement. 
 
                                                   
5 Just one of these petitions concerned imports froma Latin American or Caribbean country (a CVD investigation of Ni-resist piston 
inserts from Argentina filed in January 2009).  
6 Calculations based on data posted on the website of th  United States Department of Commerce. 
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II. United States initiatives  
affecting trade 
Any review of current trade policy, whether in the United States or elsewhere, 
needs to start by recognizing that the scope of this issue is far broader today 
than it was a generation ago. Whereas "trade" was once defined solely as the 
movement of goods across borders, and "trade policy" was limited to tariffs 
and other border measures that regulated that movement, the subject matter 
has since expanded to encompass a much wider array of tradables and the 
means by which they are taxed, regulated, procured and promoted. It now 
covers not only goods but also services, capital, intellectual property and even 
people; and it includes measures imposed both at and behind the border. One 
implication of this broader definition of trade and trade policy is that a wider 
range of seemingly domestic policy initiatives can now be seen to have trade 
implications, and ―if not properly crafted― may run afoul of a country's 
commitments to its trading partners. The scope of the issues to be examined is 
therefore correspondingly wide, encompassing matters that are both explicitly 
and implicitly defined as trade. 
This section reviews initiatives that have been taken recently or are 
still under way affecting the trade interests of Latin American and Caribbean 
countries. These fall into two categories. One consists of measures that are 
explicitly identified as trade policy in the most traditional sense. The other 
consists of measures that are not explicitly identifi d as trade policy per se, 
but nonetheless have major implications for the terms under which trading 
partners access the United States market. 
 
 
CEPAL - Serie Comercio internacional No 98 Trends in United States Trade with Latin America and the Caribbean and Trade… 
16 
A. Traditional trade policy 
1. Renewal of trade promotion authority 
Given the uniquely powerful position of the United States Congress in trade policymaking, the 
executive branch can do little in this field without the legislature's approval. That approval most 
frequently comes in two forms, with Congress making grants of negotiating authority before trade 
negotiations are concluded, and then making the ultimate decision on whether agreements will be 
approved or rejected. Those grants of authority, which are temporary and conditional delegations of 
congressional power, have been known since 1974 as "Fast-track" authority, and since 2002 as trade 
promotion authority (TPA). Both terms are in common use. 
TPA is intended to facilitate the consideration of trade agreements. Without a special grant of 
authority such as TPA, the only means available for approving agreements would be either formal 
submission of treaties to the Senate (where they would need to obtain the approval of two thirds of the
senators), or the submission of ordinary bills (where they would need to be approved by majorities in both the 
House and the Senate). Experience has shown that bot  of these procedures generate delays and amendments. 
Fast-track authority establishes special procedures that streamline the consideration of trade 
agreements. The rules in question require the impleenting legislation for an agreement to be voted upon 
in both the House and the Senate within 90 legislative days of its introduction; and they also prohibit any 
amendments to that legislation after it has been introduced. Fast-track authority has been considered an 
indispensable tool of United States trade policy since it was first extended in 1974. Prior to the Colombia 
FTA, none of the trade agreements submitted under this authority were delayed, amended or rejected; an 
no major trade agreements have been approved since the 1960s without such authority.7 
The last TPA expired in 2007 and the administration has indicated that it will seek a new one, 
although the timing remains open. 
The most recent grant of TPA was made by the Trade Act of 2002, which was passed by a very 
narrow and partisan margin in 2001-2002 and expired on 30 June 2007. Congress will thus have to pass an 
entirely new bill if TPA is to be renewed, and there are no special procedures for doing this. Like any 
other ordinary legislation, it will need not only the support of a majority in both the House and the Senate, 
but will also have to get past all of the parliamentary obstacles that potential opponents might erect. 
The Obama administration has signalled that it willseek a new grant of TPA, but has yet to say 
when, on what terms and for what purposes. Instead, it has engaged in a series of consultations with 
domestic stakeholders over what changes might be advisable in the rules and principles of TPA. While 
there are no specific proposals yet under public discussion, the administration is likely to propose 
negotiating objectives for future agreements that raise the profile of topics such as labour and the 
environment, together with procedural revisions that increase the authority of the legislative branch. 
It will be difficult to conclude the Doha Round unless Congress grants the President a new TPA, 
but the reverse also holds true: a fresh authority is more likely to be granted if the negotiations appear 
to be approaching a conclusion 
The fact that TPA may still be under development during the final phases of the Doha Round 
will naturally tend to enhance the role of Congress in influencing the final terms of that negotiation. 
Legislators will certainly want to be players in the endgame, and both the terms and the timing of the 
grant may well be subject to calculation and manoeuvre. This could easily have the effect of prolonging 
and complicating the process of reaching deals in both Geneva and Washington D.C. 
                                                   
7 In 2008 the Bush administration submitted the imple enting legislation for the United States-Colombia FTA to Congress without first 
reaching agreement with the congressional trade committees over the terms of this legislation. That was unprecedented, and the 
House of Representatives responded with an equally unprecedented action, by voting to withdraw TPA protections from that bill. 
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2. Revival of the Doha Round 
The most persuasive argument in favour of making a new grant of negotiating authority will be the 
need to approve the results of the DDA negotiations. That argument will naturally be stronger if the 
negotiations enter the endgame sometime soon; if the talks continue to drift along, there will be little 
perceived urgency in Washington. The same dynamic works in the reverse direction too: as long as 
negotiators in Geneva doubt that their United States counterparts have the power they need to strike a 
deal, they will be reluctant to press ahead to the final bargaining stage. 
It is worth noting that the United States business community has not yet lobbied hard for 
completion of the DDA. The current atmosphere stands i  sharp contrast to the final stages of the 
Uruguay Round in the early 1990s, when many of the leading sectors of the United States economy 
perceived that they had substantial interests in the multilateral negotiations in areas such as servics, 
intellectual property rights and investment. Accordingly, United States negotiators pressed hard for 
concessions on those issues. In contrast, the country's business community seems to perceive fewer 
potential benefits in DDA, and the frequent breakdowns and delays in the negotiations have diminished 
their interest still further. 
For the region, the main advantages of Doha Round completion consist of greater market access 
for products that still face high barriers, despite low overall tariff protection and subsidy reduction 
commitments on the part the United States. 
Before asking what it would take to revive and complete the negotiations, it is worthwhile 
considering what the region has to gain from them. More specifically, in what ways might the DDA 
negotiations improve the standing of Latin American and Caribbean countries in their trade relations 
with the United States?  
The benefits to be obtained from the round vary by country and product. As can be appreciated 
from the data in figure IV.3, United States tariffs on imports from the region are already quite low and
still falling. The average tariff has been below 1% throughout this decade, and even the average for 
dutiable imports is headed towards 1%. These averages mask significant differences among partners, 
however, as they are dominated by the two thirds of United States trade with the region that is 
conducted with FTA partners. Moreover, table IV.1 shows that only 16.3% of all United States imports 
from the region were dutiable in 2008; the rest entered duty-free either on a most-favoured nation 
(MFN) basis, under preferential programmes or under th  terms of FTAs. 
FIGURE 3 









Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the United States International 
Trade Commission. 
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these are among the less advanced manufactures shown in table 1. The average tariff paid on United States 
imports of dutiable apparel from the region was 15.6%. Only 11.9% of apparel imports were dutiable, with 
most of the rest entering under the Dominican Republic —Central America— United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), but ―for reasons 
noted below― even the United States' FTA partners did not enjoy completely free access to the United States 
apparel market. Other items that are subject to relativ y high tariffs when imported on a dutiable basis 
include leather products (9.5%), food (10.0%) and chemicals (13.3%). 
Table 2 identifies more precisely some of the high-tariff items that the United States continues to 
import from the region on a non-preferential basis. The most surprising fact highlighted by these data is he 
number of apparel items that are imported dutiable from FTA partners. The single highest tariff shown in the 
table is 32%, which applies to certain sweaters that are imported chiefly from NAFTA and CAFTA-DR 
partners. The fact that nearly US$ 31 million worth of this item was imported without the benefit of FTA 
treatment may be taken as prima facie evidence that the rules of origin set by these FTAs are too costly for 
some exporters to meet. They would rather buy theirfabric from cheaper sources outside the FTA (such as 
China), even though that entails paying a very high tariff on the finished product, than buy expensive but 
FTA-eligible fabric from the United States and thus q alify for preferential access. The same applies to other 
apparel items that are subject to relatively high MFN duties and yet are still imported on non-preferential 
terms from FTA-partner countries. The data here show t at even among the United States' FTA partners th re 
are at least some producers that would be better off if the United States tariffs on apparel products were to be 
reduced on an MFN basis in the Doha Development Agenda. 
TABLE 1 
UNITED STATES: TARIFF TREATMENT OF IMPORTS FROM LAT IN 
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BY COMMODITY GROUP, 2008 
(Millions of dollars and percentages, customs value, imports for consumption) 
 Imports Dutiable share    Average tariff on: 
 (US$ million)  Total Dutiable 
Primary products     
Oil and gas 95 753.0 30.4 0.0 0.1 
Agricultural products 13 561.0 3.4 0.2 6.3 
Minerals and ores 5 128.7 1.4 0.0 0.4 
Fish and other marine products 2 238.2 0.3 0.0 7.0 
Waste and scrap 1 441.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 
Less advanced manufactures     
Petroleum and coal products 25 061.9 57.6 0.1 0.1 
Primary metal manufacturing 21 760.0 1.7 0.1 4.7 
Chemicals 15 362.2 7.6 1.0 13.3 
Apparel and accessories 13 545.1 11.9 1.8 15.6 
Food and kindred products 8 053.3 14.6 1.5 10.0 
Fabricated metal products 6 248.9 11.4 0.4 3.5 
Plastics and rubber products 3 515.0 13.0 0.5 4.0 
Beverages and tobacco products 3 498.8 11.0 0.4 3.6 
Non-metallic mineral products 3 408.6 18.1 0.8 4.6 
Leather and allied products 2 543.6 21.7 2.0 9.5 
Paper 2 057.9 0.5 0.0 5.0 
Wood products 1 940.4 10.1 0.6 5.6 
Furniture and fixtures 1 560.8 0.8 0.0 3.1 
More advanced manufactures     
Transportation equipment 47 804.2 4.6 0.1 2.7 
Computer and electronic products 46 742.6 2.0 0.0 2.4 
Electrical equipment and appliances 17 166.5 9.0 0.3 2.9 
Machinery, except electrical 13 225.4 5.9 0.2 2.9 
Miscellaneous manufactured commodities 8 135.6 1.2 0.0 3.3 
All other 14 784.6    
Total 374 537.5 16.3 0.3 1.6 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the United 

























































UNITED STATES: SELECTED HIGH-TARIFF ITEMS IN NON-PR EFERENTIAL IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEA N COUNTRIES, 2008 
(Non-preferential imports for consumption, customs value; listed in descending order of tariff levels) 
 Imports  
(US$ 1000) 
Tariff (%) Top non-preferential suppliers in region  
6110.30.30: Sweaters, pullovers & similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of manmade fibres 30 962 32.0 Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras 
2204.29.60: Grape wine, other than sparkling, not over 14% vol. alcohol, in containers over 4 
litres 
18 362 30.4 Argentina 
2207.20.00: Ethyl alcohol & other spirits, denatured, of any strength 35 045 29.8 Brazil, Jamaica 
6204.63.35: Women's or girls' trousers, breeches & shorts, not knitted or crocheted, synthetic 
fibres 
24 386 28.6 Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico 
2009.11.00: Orange juice, frozen, unfermented & not containing added spirit 167 978 28.4 Brazil, Argentina 
6203.43.40: Men's or boys' trousers, breeches & shorts, of synthetic fibres 12 167 27.9 Dominican Republic Guatemala, Mexico 
2207.10.60: Undenatured ethyl alcohol of 80% vol. alcohol or higher, for non-beverage 
purposes 
438 573 25.3 Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay 
6112.41.00: Women's or girls' knitted or crocheted swimwear of synthetic fibres 17 315 24.9  Mexico, Brazil, Dominican Republic 
0406.90.33: Goya cheese not from cow's milk, over quota 21 512 21.3 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
6105.10.00: Men's or boys' shirts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 19 634 19.7 Guatemala, Peru, Honduras 
6106.10.00: Women's or girls' blouses & shirts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 17 001 19.7 Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
6204.62.40: Women's or girls' trousers, breeches & shorts, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton 83 328 16.6 Mexico, Nicaragua, Guatemala 
6203.42.40: Men's or boys' trousers & shorts, not bibs, not knitted or crocheted, of cotton 53 809 16.6 Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, Mexico 
6110.20.20: Sweaters, pullovers & similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 490 993 16.5 Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador 
6109.10.00: T-shirts, singlets, tank tops & similar garments, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 179 909 16.5 Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador 
2009.39.60: Citrus juice of any single fruit (other than orange, grapefruit or lime), unfermented 19 937 16.1 Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay. 
6104.62.20: Women's or girls' trousers, breeches & shorts, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 70 914 14.9 Guatemala, Nicaragua, Mexico 
2009.12.25: Orange juice, not frozen, Brix value not exceed 20, not concentrated, 
unfermented 
62 673 13.1 Brazil 
6114.20.00: Garments, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 52 307 10.8 Guatemala, Nicaragua, Honduras 
2009.69.00: Grape juice (including grape must), of a Brix value exceeding 30, unfermented 92 101 10.6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
6403.91.90: Footwear w/outer soles of rubber/plastics/comp. leather & uppers of leather 45 616 10.0 Brazil, Colombia, Mexico 
6403.59.90: Footwear w/outer soles & uppers of leather, not cov. ankle, n/welt 71 347 10.0 Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay 
6403.99.90: Footwear w/outer soles of rubber/plastics/etc. & uppers of leather, >US$ 2.50/pair 266 047 10.0 Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic 
6302.60.00: Toilet linen and kitchen linen, of terry towelling or similar terry fabrics, of cotton 111 034 9.1 Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the United States International Trade Commission.  
Note: some product descriptions are abbreviated and some tariffs are the ad valorem equivalents for specific tariffs (calculated on the basis of average unit prices in 2008 for 
imports from the region). 
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Most of the other high-tariff items shown in table 1 are either footwear or agricultural products 
imported chiefly from MERCOSUR countries. Products such as wine, frozen orange juice and leather shoes 
are all GSP-ineligible and pay duties that are many times higher than the average United States tariff on 
dutiable imports from the region (1.6%). 
Nor are the benefits of DDA limited to improvements i  access to the United States market for goods. 
One of the main advantages of these multilateral talks, compared to the now-terminated FTAA negotiations, 
is that United States agricultural subsidies are on the table, although it is uncertain just how ambitious the 
final package may be on this subject. Other likely areas of gain to the region could be in the antidumping 
negotiations (if, as a result, the United States abandons its practice of "zeroing" when calculating ati-
dumping margins) and in trade facilitation (if the n w commitments moderate the negative trade impact of 
initiatives such as the United States Container Security Initiative).   
What are the plans of the Obama administration for DDA? To date it has been clear only on two 
points. One is that it does favour completion of the alks and the other is that ―like its predecessor― the 
administration expects "advanced developing countries" such as Brazil, China and India to make deeper 
commitments than they have signalled thus far.  
The United States position under both the current and the previous administration has been that the 
package on the table since July 2008 is not sufficiently attractive in terms of new market access opportunities 
for United States exporters of manufactures, agricultural products and services. According to the United 
States authorities, this mainly reflects weak opening commitments by the main emerging economies, which 
they see as standing in contrast with the high economic and political costs the United States would have to 
face in reducing its own agricultural subsidies andits tariffs on sensitive industrial products such as textiles, 
clothing and footwear. This explains the United States' insistent calls for deeper commitments by key 
developing countries, for example through participation in sectoral tariff elimination initiatives in the context 
of the Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) negotiations. 
3. Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences  
The current authorization for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) will expire at the end of 
2009 unless Congress enacts new legislation to renew it. 
GSP provides duty-free access to the United States market for many developing-country 
products, covering roughly one third of the items in the tariff schedule, while excluding goods that are 
duty-free on an MFN basis and many items that have never been designated for GSP or have been 
removed from the programme (some of which face relativ ly high tariff barriers). The reauthorization 
of this programme theoretically affects every country in the region except Cuba (which has never been 
designated for GSP benefits) and the United States' FTA partners (which are automatically removed 
from the programme when their FTA status takes effect). In reality, however, the programme is now 
significant for only a handful of countries in the region. 
GSP has declined over the years as a factor in United S ates trade with Latin America and the 
Caribbean. In 1990, 8.7% of United States imports from the region entered under this programme, but 
this share fell progressively to 4.1% in 1995, 1.9% in 2000, and just 1.4% in 2008. There are two 
reasons for this. First, all but seven of the countries in the region that trade with the United States are 
eligible for the larger preferences extended either under regional preferences, such as those extended 
under the programmes for the Andean countries and the Caribbean Basin, or through FTAs. Moreover, 
a growing share of imports is eligible for duty-free treatment on an MFN basis. 
With the exception of Paraguay, the GSP revision is of limited importance for the region, 
although it could have significant implications for the Plurinational State of Bolivia unless that 
country’s ATPA status is restored. 
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Table 3 shows the limited scope of GSP treatment for pr ducts of interest to Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Only two of the top 25 products that the United States imported from the region 
in 2008 are GSP-eligible. Moreover, only one of these products faced a relatively high tariff when 
imported on a non-preferential basis, and therefore received a relatively high margin of preference 
through GSP. Another 10 products that accounted for three quarters of the value of these top 25 items 
were dutiable and not eligible for GSP; three of them are subject to tariffs in excess of 10%. These 
products can receive duty-free treatment only under an FTA or the special preferences granted under 
APTA and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The remaining 13 items are duty-free on an MFN 
basis. 
The seven countries in the region that still rely upon GSP as the sole means of preferential access to 
the United States market are the four members of MERCOSUR, plus the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the Plurinational State of Bolivia (which had benefited from the superior ATPA preferences 
until it was suspended from this programme in October 2008), and Suriname (which is listed in United 
States law as a potential CBI beneficiary but has never been designated to the programme). GSP accounts 
for a negligible share of imports from Suriname (0.2% in 2008), and the special case of Bolivia is 
discussed elsewhere in this report. Recent trends i GSP imports from the other five countries are 
illustrated in figure 4. These five countries accounted for 85.8% of United States imports under GSP from 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2008. Most of the other GSP imports come from countries that 
could alternatively have shipped the goods under the Andean or Caribbean Basin programmes. 
The data show that Paraguay is the only country in the group that ships a large and growing 
share of its goods to the United States under GSP. The programme also accounts for an appreciable 
share of imports from Argentina and Uruguay, but for less than 10% of those from Brazil and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The latter two countries' shipments under the programme are 
circumscribed by the programme's competitive need limits, under which a country will generally lose 
its duty-free privileges for specific items whenever it provides more than half of United States' imports 
of that product, and by the fact that crude oil (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela's main export) is 
not designated for GSP treatment. 
The future of GSP is therefore of greater interest to Paraguay than to any other country in the 
region. Its rising exports under GSP consist primarly of sugar (Harmonized Tariff System (HTS) item 
1701.99.10). The United States imported US$ 34.9 million in this product from Paraguay in 2008, 
which accounted for 42.9% of all its imports from that country and 56.4% of the imports from 
Paraguay under GSP. That is up from just US$ 5.9 million worth of this product imported from 
Paraguay in 2006. When imported on a non-preferential basis, this product is subject to a specific duty 
that amounts to an ad valorem equivalent rate of 6.6% (at average 2008 prices). Other significant items 
in United States imports from Paraguay under GSP include wood products such as builders' joinery 
(HTS item 4418.90.46), which would otherwise face a 3.2% tariff, and two types of plywood (HTS 
items 4412.31.25 and 4412.32.31) that are each subject to an MFN duty of 8.0%. The programme thus 
extends a wide margin of preference to key Paraguayan goods. 
Another initiative now in Congress would also affect the terms of Paraguay's preferences. A bill has 
been introduced in both the House (H.R.1837) and the Senate (S.780) that would allow the President to 
designate Paraguay to the Andean Trade Preferences Act. The sponsors believe that Paraguay should be 
rewarded for its cooperation on anti-narcotics and ti-terrorist programmes and they may attempt to 












UNITED STATES: GSP ELIGIBILITY OF THE 25 MAIN PRODU CTS IMPORTED FROM  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2008 
(Millions of dollars, customs value, imports for consumption) 
Item number and description Value 
(US$ million) 
MFN Tariff 
Duty-Free on an MFN basis (19.6% of top 25)   
8517.12.00: Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks 5 036.2 Free 
8471.50.01: Certain processing units  3 773.6 Free 
2713.11.00: Coke, petroleum, not calcined 3 056.4 Free 
2711.11.00: Natural gas, liquefied 2 912.4 Free 
9401.90.10: Parts of seats, for seats of a kind used for motor vehicles 2 836.7 Free 
8517.62.00: Switching & routing apparatus 2 805.8 Free 
0901.11.00: Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated 2 711.3 Free 
9018.90.80: Instruments & appliances used in medical, surgical, etc. 2 413.8 Free 
7108.12.10: Gold, nonmonetary, bullion & dore 2 382.2 Free 
2814.10.00: Anhydrous ammonia 2 192.3 Free 
8517.70.00: Parts of telephone sets  2 187.2 Free 
7106.91.10: Silver bullion & dore 2 128.5 Free 
2711.29.00: Petroleum gases, except natural gas 2 016.2 Free 
Eligible for GSP and other preferences (4.0% of top 25) 
  
8544.30.00: Insulated ignition wiring sets & other used in vehicles 4 113.8 5.0% 
7403.11.00: Refined copper cathodes & sections of cathodes 3 289.2 1.0% 
Dutiable and not GSP-eligible (76.4% of top 25)   
2709.00.10: Petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals, crude, <25° 68 810.7 0.1% 
2709.00.20: Petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals, crude, ≥25° 20 725.1 0.1% 
8528.72.72: Colour television reception apparatus w/flat panel screen 14 241.8 5.0% 
2710.19.05: Distillate & residual fuel oil derived from petroleum or oils  11 274.5 0.1% 
8703.23.00: Motor cars & other motor vehicles for transport of persons 10 426.2 2.5% 
8704.31.00: Motor vehicles for transport of goods 5 115.8 25.0% 
2710.11.25: Naphthas from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals  3 985.9 0.1% 
8703.24.00: Motor cars & other motor vehicles for transport of persons 3 061.5 2.5% 
6109.10.00: T-shirts, singlets, tank tops & similar garments, of cotton 2 242.8 16.5% 
6110.20.20: Sweaters, pullovers & similar articles, of cotton  2 179.3 16.5% 
Subtotal, top 25 products (49.6% of Total) 185.919.2  
All other products 188 618.3  
Total 374 537.5  
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the 
United States International Trade Commission.  
Note: some product descriptions are abbreviated for reasons of space. The tariff rates shown for petroleum and 





























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the 
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Reauthorization of GSP could encounter opposition in Congress, where critics claim that certain 
middle-income GSP beneficiary countries do not merit this preferential treatment. For example, some 
legislators have argued that countries such as Brazil and India have not been sufficiently willing to 
open their own markets in the DDA negotiations. In their view, the threatened loss or reduction of GSP 
benefits should be used as leverage to secure deeper commitments from these countries. 
There is as yet no GSP-renewal bill under consideration in Congress, nor has the Obama 
administration made a specific proposal for either renewal or revision of the programme. While there is 
a good chance that the issue will be addressed later in 2009, the debate over this matter may well raise 
concerns on the part of the United States over the alleged intransigence of middle-income countries. 
Depending on the pace of progress in DDA, the debate over GSP renewal could become caught up in 
the endgame of the round and be used as a form of leverage with the middle-income countries. 
B. Trade-related policies 
The growth of trade in agricultural products has been accompanied worldwide by a growing number of 
standards and regulations and stricter enforcement. These standards are intended to prevent the spread 
of diseases, pests, toxins and other contaminants present in imported products. In the case of both food 
and pharmaceutical products, standards relate to packaging, labelling, the registration of producers, and 
the certification of processes and reported nutritional values. 
The United States has been no exception to these trnds. Although only 1% of imported cargo is 
inspected at United States customs, this figure represents tens of thousands of imported products which 
are stopped at United States ports every year. Between 2006 and 2008 about 20% of stopped shipments 
consisted of fish products, fruits and vegetables, sweets, non-alcoholic beverages, cosmetics, and 
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episodes relate to non-compliance with United States rules and procedures, such as omissions and 
imprecise labelling, or the lack of an application for approval or registration of the product or 
manufacturing process concerned. In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, a third of the 
episodes concern the presence of pesticides in concentrations above those considered innocuous to 
human health, the presence of salmonella, or the fact th t the product is dirty or decomposed (Artecona 
and Flores 2009). Improving this situation poses a cle r challenge to the region's exporters. 
Actions taken by the United States on other trade-related matters may have as great an impact on 
Latin American and Caribbean interests as does United S ates trade policy per se. 
Although measures in such fields as social and enviro mental policy are not originally intended 
to affect trade, they may do so through at least two ways. One is that they provide opportunities to 
introduce taxes, regulations, incentives, or other m asures that discriminate against foreign providers of 
goods and services. Second, any attention policymakers devote to these initiatives will entail the 
opportunity cost of preventing them from attending to other matters. This crowding-out effect is 
especially notable in the case of trade policy, insofar as the congressional committees chiefly 
responsible for this subject (the Ways and Means Committee in the House of Representatives and the 
Finance Committee in the Senate) also have jurisdict on over taxes and major aspects of the health-care 
reform.  
The potential impact of trade-related policies is reviewed in three sections below. The first of 
these concerns the "Buy American" provisions of the economic stimulus package. This may set a 
precedent for how the executive and legislative branches of the Government of the United States handle 
other trade-related matters, such as the health-care reform and climate-change measures discussed 
below. Another concern is the increased use of subsidies to boost domestic industries. 
1. The controversy over the "Buy American" provisio ns 
The potential importance of trade-related initiatives was shown in the administration's very first 
undertaking, when its nearly US$ 1 trillion stimulus package provided an opportunity for some 
members of Congress to try to prevent these funds from being used to purchase foreign steel and other 
products. The conclusion of this episode was somewhat ambiguous. While it demonstrated that the 
administration is prepared to act to ensure that the United States complies with its international 
obligations, it also showed the eagerness of certain legislators to exploit the opportunities inherent in 
the administration's trade-related priorities for protectionist purposes.  
Given concerns over potentially protectionist interpr tations of the “Buy American” clause in the 
economic stimulus package, an amendment was introduced to express the United States’ commitment 
to obligations assumed under international agreements. 
The US$ 787 billion stimulus bill that Congress approved in February 2009 (the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act) generally requires all of the iron, steel and other manufactured goods 
used in the programme (including US$ 48 billion for transportation projects) to be made in the United 
States.8 In response to the administration's concerns over sending a protectionist message, the Senate 
amended the bill to specify that the provisions "shall be applied in a manner consistent with United 
States obligations under international agreements". This wording remained in the final bill that 
President Obama signed into law. 
The so-called "BRIC" group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) appear to have been the real 
targets of the amendment, for these countries, especially China, are seen as major contributors to the 
United States trade deficit. Given the wording of the amendment, it may have a much greater effect on 
these countries than on the United States' other trading partners. The data in table IV.4 show that the 
                                                   
8 There are certain exceptions to this provision: (i) when it is inconsistent with the public interest; (ii) where the United States does not 
produce enough readily available iron, steel and related manufactured goods of satisfactory quality; and (3) when the use of iron, steel 
and manufactured goods produced in the United States increases the total cost of a project by over 25%.   
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BRICs jointly accounted for nearly one-third of United States iron and steel imports in 2008. Targetin 
of the BRICs is facilitated by the fact that the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) is a 
plurilateral undertaking, meaning that only those countries that signed it are subject to its disciplines 
and entitled to its benefits. Current GPA signatories consist primarily of industrialized countries. 
It is United States law and practice to grant exceptions to "Buy American" rules to four 
categories of trading partners: GPA signatories, countries that have government-procurement rights 
under their FTAs with the United States, CBI beneficiaries, and the least-developed countries (LDCs).9 
As they do not belong to any of these categories, the BRICs and many other suppliers will likely be 
closed out of this segment of the United States market.10 As table 4 shows, Mexico and Chile are the 
only large suppliers of iron and steel in the region that enjoy secure access to United States government 
procurement by dint of the latter's commitments under FTAs. 
TABLE 4 
UNITED STATES: IMPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL, 2008 
(Imports for consumption, customs value) 
 Imports  
(US$ 1000) 
Share of Total 
Latin America and the Caribbean 8 704 248 19.0 
Brazil 3 352 637 7.3 
Mexicoa 3 151 052 6.9 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 630 843 1.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 520 761 1.1 
Colombia 415 222 0.9 
Argentina 293 950 0.6 
Dominican Republic 209 949 0.5 
Chile a 119 565 0.3 
Other Latin American and Caribbean 
countries b 
10 269 <0.1 
Rest of World 37 008 257 81.0 
China 7 597 823 16.6 
Canada a 6 969 562 15.2 
Republic of Korea a 2 307 197 5.0 
Japan a 2 307 172 5.0 
Germany a 1 972 118 4.3 
India 1 830 600 4.0 
Russian Federation 1 722 747 3.8 
Ukraine 1 482 637 3.2 
South Africa 1 221 361 2.7 
Other countries 9 597 040 21.0 
BRICs   
Brazil+Russia+India+China 14 503 807 31.7 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of figures from the United States International Trade Commission. 
                                                   
9 Nonetheless, Canada, which is a signatory to both NAFTA and GPA, has complained about discrimination against Canadian firms at 
the sub-federal (local) level. 
10 In the medium term, this could translate into larger flows of foreign investment into Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic, since these have FTAs with the United States (ECLAC, 2009a).   
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a Countries that have access to the United States market for contracts subject to 
"Buy American" rules owing to their status as signatories to GPA or an FTA with 
the United States, or both. 
b The United States imported small quantities of steel from Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. 
2. Subsidies for the automotive dairy industries 
Another policy instrument that has been used more int nsively since the onset of the economic crisis 
and that may be associated with the emergence of protectionist tendencies in the United States is the 
granting of subsidies to specific sectors. 
As part of the Automobile Industry Financing Program introduced in March 2009, the Government 
of the United States extended loans totalling US$ 24.7 billion to two of the country’s largest auto 
manufacturers, General Motors and Chrysler, and to their financial arms, GMAC and Chrysler Financial, 
in order to avert the systemic risk that would be posed by their bankruptcy. The companies benefiting 
under the scheme are required to undertake restructuring to ensure their long-term viability.  
Developing nations have long contended that the agricultural subsidies granted to United States 
farmers are protectionist. Newfarmer and Gamberoni (2009) estimated in early 2009 that the amount 
spent by the United States on distortive agricultura  subsidies rose from US$ 8.1 billion in 2008 to US$ 
9.9 billion in 2009 (some 22%), as a result of the anticipated fall in the prices of several products, 
including wheat, maize, rice, cotton and soybean, whose international prices dropped by between 23% 
and 43% between May 2008 and April 2009.11 Several agricultural subsidy programmes in the United 
States are structured countercyclically, inasmuch as the amount of the subsidy varies in inverse 
proportion to international price movements. If these projections are borne out, the worst affected 
countries in the region would be Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and 
Uruguay, which are major producers and exporters of these crops. 
Lastly, on 22 May 2009 the United States authorities announced the reintroduction of payments 
under a scheme of direct subsidies for diary exports. This measure was presented as a response to a 
similar decision by the European Union in January 2009. 
3. Trade-related initiatives now under development 
Several high-priority areas on which the Obama administration is now working do not primarily 
concern trade but may have significant impacts on the trade interests of Latin American countries. 
Health-care reform, climate-change policy, tax refom and efforts to enhance port security, 
consumer safety, and workers' rights all have the pot ntial to produce rules, fees or incentives that 
favour domestic goods, services, workers and investors over their foreign counterparts. 
Health-care reform is perhaps the number one issue for the Democrats in both branches of 
government. The details have yet to be developed, but it is generally expected that the administration 
will press for a system in which the Government plays  much larger role in providing or paying for 
treatment. While the main objective of this initiative has little to do with trade, there are several w ys 
in which the actions taken by the United States might affect the trade interests of other countries. 
The initiative could affect countries in the region through its financing; one of the options 
currently being floated is to increase taxes on alcoholic or sugar-containing beverages or both.12 While 
it would certainly be possible for the United States o do this without violating the rights of its trading 
                                                   
11 See Index Mundi [online] http://indexmundi.com/commodities/. 
12 For more precise information on the options, see Snate Finance Committee, Financing Comprehensive Health Care Reform: 
Proposed Health System Savings and Revenue Options, [ line] http://www.finance.senate.gov/sitepages/leg/LEG%202009/ 
051809%20Health%20Care%20Description%20of%20Policy%20Options.pdf, 20 May 2009, 
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partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, increased taxation could still have the effect of depressing 
demand and thus reduce sugar and alcohol imports.13 
Many other trade-related issues could be affected by a health-care reform initiative, including the 
costs of pharmaceuticals and protection of their intellectual property rights; access for foreign doctors, 
nurses and other medical personnel to the United States; the "portability" of health insurance (the 
ability of the insured to seek medical treatment overseas); foreign investment in the United States 
insurance market, hospitals and other segments of the health and medical sector; and a range of other 
issues affecting the providers and recipients of medical treatment. These are matters that will need to 
be monitored as the administration and Congress develop their initiatives in the coming months. 
The “cap-and-trade” system to reduce greenhouse gas emi sions and the related trade 
amendments could curtail exports from developing countries. 
Another wide-ranging initiative currently under way would establish a "cap-and-trade" system to 
reduce the output of greenhouse gases, with the aim of slowing or halting the effect that these gases 
have on climate. More than any other issue today, this one reveals a sharp break between the previous 
Republican administration and its Democratic successor. The Bush administration long argued that 
there was as yet no scientific consensus on global warming, and that position is still held by most 
Republicans in Congress. In contrast, Democrats in both branches of government believe they must 
now make up for lost time and are working to enact new legislation quickly.  
As in the case of health-care reform, there are sevral ways in which this initiative could result 
in discrimination against foreign providers of goods and services. There is a widespread concern in 
United States manufacturing circles that restrictions n production in the United States may simply 
lead to "job leakage", with purchasers or producers of carbon-intensive goods moving their factories or 
sourcing to overseas facilities that are not subject to the same restrictions. These concerns have led to 
measures being taken to discourage such practices through surcharges or other restrictions on imports 
from "dirty" sources. Discrimination could also arise if the cap-and-trade approach is either 
supplemented with or replaced by a carbon tax; such a tax could easily be structured in a way that 
affects imports more severely than domestic production. It is also possible that the various schemes to 
promote “green manufacturing” in the United States will lead to subsidies, buy-national restrictions on 
utilities owned or funded by the government, or other measures that could violate the spirit or even th  
letter of the country's commitments under various WTO agreements. 
The amendment to the American Clean Energy and Security Act paves the way for the 
application of a border tax on goods from countries that have not adopted regulations to reduce 
emissions that would match United States laws.  
The legislative proposal approved by the Energy and Commerce Committee in the House of 
Representatives on 21 May 2009 did not seem to run afoul of any of these concerns. The Committee’s 
version of the American Clean Energy and Security Act (H.R.2454, or ACES) directed that all 
emissions of greenhouse gases will be subject to res rictions that will be tightened until 2050, by whic  
time total emissions should not exceed 17% of the amount emitted in 2005. Although gases are to be 
capped, firms and others will also be permitted to trade permits allowing their use. On the face of it, 
none of the bill’s provisions appeared to be discriminatory. Immediately prior to approval of the Act by 
the full House of Representatives on 26 June, however, the Chairman of the Trade Subcommittee of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, Sander Levin, proposed an amendment to the Tariff Act of 1930 
which adds a new Title IX “Promoting International Reductions in Industrial Emissions”. The bill 
directs the United States to negotiate an internatio l agreement on greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions. All countries, including “fast-growing developing countries”, would be required to adopt 
the international agreement or enact laws and regulations imposing emissions restrictions that match 
those required by United States law. If this bill were enacted, the president would be required to 
                                                   
13 A step has already been taken in this direction. One of the new administration's first legislative acts was a bill (Public Law 111-3) to 
finance an expansion in children's health insurance partly through higher taxes on tobacco products. 
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request United States trading partners to take “appropriate measures to limit the greenhouse gas 
emissions of the foreign country in order to achieve the purposes [of Title IX]”. As of 1 January 2020 
or earlier, exports from countries that do not comply with this requirement would be penalized with a 
border tax designed to minimize or avoid any carbon leakage from signatory to non-signatory countries. 
The bill also would establish an “international reserve allowance program” under which foreign 
countries that met emissions criteria set by the United States could purchase allowances for import into 
the United States of goods included among “eligible ndustrial sectors” listed by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Only imports covered by the allowances would be permitted entry into the United 
States. This provision would not apply to countries determined to have enacted emissions laws and 
regulations equivalent to or more stringent than those of the United States, countries identified by the 
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations as least developed countries, those responsible for 
very tiny percentages of global emissions and those that export less than 5% of a particular good 
covered by the programme.  
This amendment is intended to offset the disadvantages to United States domestic industries that 
would result from imposition of the cap-and-trade system and to push for an international agreement to 
restrict carbon emissions. It may be seen as an effort to strengthen the position of United States 
negotiators as they prepare for the United Nations Climate Change Conference that will take place in 
Copenhagen on 7-18 December 2009. The proponents of he amendment argue that it creates no 
conflict with the United States’ international trade obligations, since Article XX of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade allows exceptions for environmental requirements. That view appears 
not to be shared by President Obama, however.14 
At the time of writing, the bill awaits action in the Senate. Then, once the upper chamber has 
developed its bill, the versions of the two houses will need to be reconciled. It may be many more 
months before the final terms of this legislation are known. Even more than the health-care reform 
proposal, this initiative has potential for discrimination against imported goods and services, and will 
thus merit close attention. 
 
                                                   
14 In a press interview, President Obama stated that: “At a time when the economy worldwide is still deep in recession and we’ve seen a 
significant drop in global trade, I think we have to be very careful about sending any protectionist signals out there […] I think we’re 
going to have to do a careful analysis to determine wh ther the prospects of tariffs are necessary, given all the other stuff that was 
done and had been negotiated on behalf of energy-intensive industries.” While acknowledging that, “It is a legitimate concern on the 
part of American businesses that they are not disadvantaged vis-à-vis their global competitors,” the Pr sident said he was “very 
mindful of wanting to make sure that there’s a leve playing field internationally. I think there may be other ways of doing it than with 
a tariff approach.” New York Times, 28 June 2009. 
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III. Pending issues in United States 
trade relations with the region 
A. Bilateral and subregional trade initiatives 
The Obama administration inherited several bilateral and subregional policies 
and initiatives affecting United States trade with the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, some as old as the Cuban trade embargo and others 
dating from the final months of the Bush administration. Bilateral and 
subregional initiatives are likely to receive more attention than regional or 
multilateral ones in the immediate future, as the administration faces some 
impending deadlines that will force it to act soon. 
United States trade with the region is fairly heavily concentrated, 
since a few partners account for a large proportion of it. 
As figure 5 shows, Mexico alone accounts for over half of this 
trade, and the next three partners take up about half of the remaining 
share. The United States' partners in the region can be distinguished not 
only by size, but also by the legal and political nture of the relationship. 
The links drawn between trade policy and diplomacy were strengthened 
during the eight years of the Bush administration, which used both FTAs 
and preferential programmes to encourage cooperation on a range of 
issues. The number of FTA partners in the region grew from just one to 
nine during this time and, if the pending agreements wi h Colombia and 
Panama are finally ratified, it could yet rise to elev n. As shown in figure 
6, FTAs and (to a much lesser degree) preferences have elped to ensure 
that only a small share of United States imports from the region remain 
subject to MFN tariffs. 
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Only 16.3% of all United States imports from the region were dutiable in 2008: the rest either 
entered duty-free on an MFN basis or were covered by FTAs or preferences. 
Table 5 shows that dutiable imports come primarily f om a few countries that remain outside the 
circle of negotiated or autonomous preferences, particularly the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
the member countries of MERCOSUR. For nearly every country that is either an FTA partner or 
benefits from regional preferences, dutiable items account for less than 20% of total imports. Tariffs 
are higher for countries that benefit only from GSP, but even for these average duties tend to be 
relatively low.  
There are several outstanding issues that could change this status quo, either by improving the 
access that a partner enjoys (Colombia, Cuba, and Pama) or by worsening it through the expiration of 
preferences (with both GSP and ATPA scheduled to expir  in 2009).15 There follows a review of 
several initiatives on which the United States could act in the coming months. Apart from the special 
case of Cuba, these topics proceed in a southerly squence, starting with the country that is 
economically and geographically closest to the United States. 
FIGURE 5 
UNITED STATES: SHARES OF TOTAL TRADE WITH LATIN AME RICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2008 







Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of figures from the United States International Trade Commission. 
 
FIGURE 6 
UNITED STATES: TARIFF TREATMENT OF IMPORTS FROM LAT IN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 








                                                   
15 One issue not considered at any length here is the renewal of the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA), as its expiration 
date (30 September 2010) comes well after other deadlin s reviewed here. It would not be surprising, however, if Congress were to 
act on CBTPA more or less concurrently with the other expiring preference programmes, including GSP (reviewed above in section 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures 
from the United States International Trade Commission. 
TABLE 5 
UNITED STATES: TARIFF TREATMENT OF IMPORTS FROM  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN BY COUNTRY, 2008 
(Millions of dollars, customs value, imports for consumption) 
 Imports Dutiable share      Average tariff on: 
FTA partners (US$ million)  Total  Dutiable 
Mexico 216 328.4 3.8 0.1 2.5 
Chile 8 182.3 5.0 0.2 3.2 
Peru a 5 839.9 5.7 0.1 1.8 
Honduras 4 056.7 7.2 0.9 12.6 
Dominican Republic 3 953.9 5.0 0.4 9.0 
Costa Rica a 3 926.4 5.6 0.3 4.8 
Guatemala 3 441.6 19.1 2.6 13.6 
El Salvador 2 227.0 10.7 1.4 13.0 
Nicaragua 1 707.4 12.2 1.7 14.0 
Regional preferences     
Colombia b 13 058.8 8.0 0.1 0.7 
Ecuador 9 043.8 12.5 0.0 0.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 8 996.4 11.1 0.0 0.2 
Jamaica 704.2 3.0 0.0 0.5 
Bahamas 595.7 14.8 0.2 1.1 
Haiti 449.7 1.7 0.2 12.2 
Panamab 373.7 9.7 0.3 2.7 
Belize 157.1 1.3 0.0 2.8 
Guyana 145.8 1.0 0.0 1.0 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 54.3 5.7 0.1 1.8 
Saint Lucia  41.6 7.3 0.1 1.0 
Barbados 40.8 6.6 0.2 3.2 
Grenada  7.3 12.2 0.2 1.4 
Antigua and Barbuda 5.0 5.9 0.1 2.2 
Dominica  2.3 54.8 5.6 10.2 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1.0 11.1 2.2 20.2 
GSP beneficiaries     
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 50 281.2 55.7 0.1 0.1 
Brazil 30 060.7 41.4 1.3 3.2 
Argentina 5 680.3 49.3 0.9 1.8 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 540.4 12.8 0.4 3.4 
Uruguay 243.9 39.9 1.5 3.7 
Suriname 126.3 0.8 0.0 2.6 
Paraguay 81.3 6.8 0.7 10.0 
Subject to sanctions     
Cuba <0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the 
United States International Trade Commission. 
a Costa Rica's status as a CAFTA-DR partner did not take effect until 1 January 2009, and the FTA with Peru did 
not enter into effect until 1 February 2009. The data shown for these two countries therefore reflect tariff 
treatment of their goods under the Caribbean Basin and Andean preferences, respectively, rather than their 
FTAs. 
b The FTAs with Colombia and Panama are still pending approval in the United States Congress. 
c The Plurinational State of Bolivia received Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA)/Andean Trade Promotion and 








UNITED STATES TRADE RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL: A SPECIA L CASE 
One of the peculiarities of inter-American trade relations is the somewhat tangential manner in which the 
United States and Brazil approach mutual trade relations. These two countries account for large shares of 
trade in the hemisphere and each plays a major role, yet their direct relations with one another are played out 
more at the multilateral than at the regional level. 
A look at the total magnitude of inter-American trade (defined here as all trade between Latin American 
countries and between the United States and the region)a shows that the United States is a party to almost 
two thirds of it (65.6%) and Brazil is involved in 11.8% of the transactions. Yet, despite their great weight in 
the regional total, trade between the United States and Brazil accounts for 15.7% of Brazil’s trade (as against 
22.3% that is conducted with the rest of the region) and, even though Brazil is the United States’ third largest 
partner in the region, it accounts for just 1.6% of that country’s trade. In other words, bilateral trade between 
the United States and Brazil amounts to only 4.8% of all inter-American trade. That is one reason why these 
countries each tend to devote more attention to their relations with other countries in the region than they do 
to trade with one another. Rivalries between the two figured prominently among the political dynamics that 
contributed to the demise of the FTAA negotiations.  
As a general rule, WTO remains the main forum for trade relations between the United States and Brazil 
and is the prism through which most United States trade policymakers see relations with Brazil. Interestingly 
enough, Brazil is targeted in some of the other high-profile matters in United States trade and trade-related 
policy. This includes the views held by some policymakers that middle-income countries should not continue 
to receive preferential access under GSP unless they become more cooperative in the WTO negotiations, 
the controversy over the “Buy American” provision and competition with the BRICs, as well as concerns that 
emerging industrial economies will undermine the measures aimed at halting climate change. 
a Calculations are based on the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics series. 
 
 
1. Implementation and revisions of NAFTA 
Mexico was the first Latin American country to sign a free trade agreement (NAFTA) with the United 
States. The evolving trade relationship between both c untries over the last fifteen years under NAFTA 
may serve as a useful case study for other current or potential FTA partners in the region, as it 
illustrates the types of issues that still exist even after a comprehensive agreement is reached. 
As Mexico is the United States' third-largest trading partner after Canada and China, it is 
unsurprising that disputes have arisen between the two partners since NAFTA came into effect in 1994. 
In addition to numerous but relatively minor disagreements over antidumping (AD) measures and 
countervailing duties (CVD), there are also a few more serious sources of friction in the relationship. 
One concerns the failure of the United States to abide y a commitment that it made under NAFTA, 
and the other is the stated interest of the United States in renegotiating certain aspects of the agreement. 
i) The unresolved trucking services issue resulted in Mexico taking retaliatory 
measures 
Of the 60 complaints that the United States or Mexico have brought against each other under the 
NAFTA dispute-settlement arrangements since 1995, only ne was not either an AD or a CVD case: 
Mexico's complaint in the long-running trucking case, which has spanned three United States and three 
Mexican presidencies. At issue here is whether the United States will honour a commitment that it 
made in its NAFTA services schedule, which specified that "three years after the date of signature of 
this Agreement, [Mexican persons may provide] cross-border truck services to or from border states 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas)," and that this commitment would extend to all states in 
2000, six years after the agreement entered into force. Opponents in Congress have tried from the very
start of the agreement to dilute or delay implementation of this commitment. Prior to 2009, the issue 
was a least partially settled through the United States Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's 
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implementation of a pilot programme that allowed some Mexican truckers to operate vehicles in the 
United States. That compromise was undone by the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, section 136 
of which prohibited the use of funds "to establish, implement, continue, promote or in any way permit" 
a demonstration programme of this sort.16 
Having exhausted its options under the NAFTA dispute-settlement mechanism, and in response 
to the United States having reneged even on the compro ise programme, Mexico retaliated. In March 
2009 Mexico imposed penalty duties ranging between 10% and 45% on 89 products from the United 
States. At the time of writing, the United States ha  not restarted the trucking programme and Mexico 
has not lifted its retaliatory duties. 
ii) Renegotiation of NAFTA provisions is not immine nt 
During his candidacy, President Obama expressed interest in renegotiating NAFTA's labour and 
environmental provisions, which aroused concerns not just in Mexico but also in Canada. Nonetheless, since 
taking office he has made visits to both countries, and while he did not formally renounce this positin he did 
not emphasize it, either. It appears that this election-year proposal might fade away with time. 
2. Free trade agreement with Panama 
The pending FTAs with Colombia, the Republic of Korea and Panama were all concluded by the Bush 
administration before the expiration of the last grant of TPA, and can thus be considered under the 
special rules of that mechanism. The delays that each of these agreements have encountered offer proof
that while TPA gives procedural advantages to the approval of an agreement, it does not guarantee that 
an agreement will be submitted for approval, voted on or ultimately approved. 
The opponents of the FTA with Panama express concerns over labour rights and the country’s 
tax and banking policies. The United States Trade Representative is attempting to negotiate a solution 
to these concerns with Panamanian authorities. 
The United States-Panama FTA was finalized in December 2006, but has since been delayed for 
two reasons. In 2007-2008 both the Bush administraton and the candidates for the Democratic 
presidential nomination agreed that the FTA should not be submitted while a diplomatic dispute 
remained unsettled.17 Although the dispute is now resolved, the opponents of this FTA have shifted 
their focus to concerns over labour rights and the banking system in Panama. 
The United States Trade Representative (USTR) is attempting to negotiate a solution to the 
concerns raised in Congress. In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on 20 May 2009, the 
Assistant USTR for the Americas, Everett Eissenstat, stated that USTR has "been working with 
Panama to address labour law concerns and looks forward to anticipated legislative and regulatory 
action by Panama that fully captures the intent and values of the Agreement's labour provisions," and 
also that the agency "share[s] concerns expressed about Panama's tax policies and [is] working with 
Panama to address these issues."18 The administration does not intend to submit the FTA for approval 
until it has reached an agreement with Panama on those issues. 
3. Andean countries: pending FTA and expiring prefe rences 
The Obama administration inherited a number of policy decisions from its predecessor regarding trade 
with the Andean countries:19 first, how to handle the pending FTA between the United States and 
Colombia; second, how to proceed over Colombia's preferences under ATPA if the FTA-approval debate 
                                                   
16 The basis for this given by United States legislators was that Mexican trucks would not offer high enough safety standards. 
17 At issue was a United States criminal indictment against a leader of the Panamanian legislature, who no l nger holds that position. 
18 See testimony [online] at http://www.ustr.gov/asset /Document_Library/Transcripts/2009/May/asset_upload_file918_15660.pdf. 
19 Note that for purposes of United States trade policy, “Andean countries” do not include the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela or 
Chile. 
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extends beyond 2009; third, how to proceed on Ecuador's ATPA benefits (which are due to expire on 30 
June 2009); and fourth, a course of action on Bolivia's currently suspended ATPA preferences.   
These decisions are only partly economic in nature. Th  United States has used trade preferences 
as a tool in its political relations with Andean countries since at least 1991, when ATPA was 
introduced to encourage diversification away from narcotic crops in recipient countries. The links 
between trade, security and diplomacy have grown closer since then, as manifested in the expanding 
scope of United States goals (anti-narcotics efforts a e now joined to anti-terrorism), the move from 
autonomous preferences to formal FTAs, concerns over labour rights in Colombia, and recent political 
tensions with the Plurinational State of Bolivia and with Ecuador. 
Figure 7 summarizes the pattern of United States trade preferences for Andean countries over the 
past decade. The original ATPA preferences enacted in 1991 offered more generous treatment than 
GSP, but did not cover major items such as oil and pparel products. That was remedied with the 
enactment of the Andean Trade Partnership and Drug Eradication Act of 2002 (ATPDEA), which 
caused a surge in the proportion of Andean goods entering the United States under preferences. It was 
nonetheless indicated to the Andean countries that these preferences were temporary and should be 
replaced by a subregional FTA with the United States. That goal shifted, however, as the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia never joined in the talks, and negotiations with Ecuador were interrupted in 2006. The 
result was a pair of bilateral FTAs: one with Peru that entered into force in February 2009, and one 
with Colombia that is still awaiting ratification ithe United States. 
The FTA with Colombia may prove to be the most difficult one to resolve, as this agreement 
faces substantial opposition from labour unions and many Democrats in Congress. 
The Obama administration is still developing its approach to Colombia. Despite pressure from 
labour unions and even from within the Democratic Party to abandon the FTA signed in November 
2006, President Obama made a commitment to President Uribe at the April 2009 Summit of the 
Americas to find a way to approve the agreement. That undertaking is now being tested through 
bilateral consultations. The Obama administration will likely seek to negotiate some additional wording 
with Colombia to strengthen the labour and environme tal provisions of the agreement, so as to garner 
the required support in Congress. In the meantime, Colombia enjoys preferential access to the United 
States market under the ATPA/ATPDEA programmes; but those preferences are scheduled to expire 
after 31 December 2009, and Congress would have to enact a new law to renew them. 
FIGURE 7  
UNITED STATES: SHARE OF IMPORTS FROM ANDEAN  











Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
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ATPA preferences were withdrawn from the Plurinational State of Bolivia in November 2008 
and Ecuador’s status is due for renewal at the end of 2009. 
The deadlines for Ecuador were even tighter, since the country’s preferences under ATPA had been 
scheduled to expire on 30 June 2009 unless President Obama certified that it had met a series of 
conditions laid out in United States law. The administration did determine that the conditions had been 
met in time for the deadline, but the decision to renew Ecuador’s preferences simply postponed 
consideration of the issue for another six months, since the statutory authorization for the programme 
itself will expire at the end of 2009. The loss of ATPA preferences would seriously impair Ecuador's 
access to the United States market: it has shipped a higher share of its goods to the United States under 
ATPA than any other beneficiary (see figure 7), andtable IV.6 shows that only a few of its leading ATPA 
products could alternatively receive duty-free treatment under GSP. Products such as tuna and frozen 
vegetables would be subject to very high MFN duties if Ecuador were to lose its ATPA preferences. 
Conversely, in the case of the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the data in table IV.6 suggest that 
the country’s full suspension from ATPA in November 2008 ―a status left unchanged by the findings 
of the Obama administration’s review of 30 June 2009― may have had a smaller impact on market 
access conditions for its exports to the United States than had been expected. Several of the items that 
Bolivia had shipped duty-free under ATPA now enter duty-free under GSP instead. The fact that fuel 
oil is not GSP-eligible is not a very great loss, since the margin of preference for this item is almost 
negligible. Nevertheless, the loss of ATPA has had a serious impact on Bolivian exporters of cotton 
sweaters, which are now subject to a 16.5% MFN duty. 
TABLE 6 
UNITED STATES: MAIN IMPORTS FROM THE PLURINATIONAL STATE OF  
BOLIVIA AND ECUADOR ENTERING UNDER ATPA/ATPDEA, 200 8 





Plurinational State of Bolivia   
Products eligible for GSP:   
7113.19.50: Precious metal (other than silver) articles of jewellery and parts  13 258 5.5% 
7116.20.15: Jewellery articles of precious or semiprecious stones, over US$ 40/piece 7 768 6.5% 
7113.19.29: Gold necklaces and neck chains (other than of rope or mixed links) 6 771 5.5% 
7108.13.70: Gold, nonmonetary, in semi-manufactured forms (except gold leaf) 6 592 4.1% 
7113.11.50: Silver articles of jewellery and parts thereof, valued over US$ 18/dozen  5 739 5.0% 
7113.19.30: Precious metal (other than silver) clasps and parts thereof 4 314 5.8% 
7113.19.21: Gold rope necklaces and neck chains 3 429 5.0% 
4418.20.80: Doors of wood, other than French doors 2 913 4.8% 
Products not eligible for GSP:   
2710.19.10: Distillate and residual fuel oil derived from petroleum oils  71 607 0.1% 
6110.20.20: Sweaters, pullovers and similar articles, knitted or crocheted, of cotton 2 857 16.5% 
Ecuador   
Products eligible for GSP:   
0603.19.00: Fresh cut Anthuriums, Alstroemeria, Gypsophilia, etc. 60 694 6.4% 
4412.32.31: Plywood sheet not over 6 millimetres thick 15 668 8.0% 
0714.90.10: Fresh or chilled dasheens 11 837 2.3% 
Products not eligible for GSP:   
2709.00.10: Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, under 25° 6 080 386 0.1% 
2710.11.25: Naphthas from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals  107 641 0.1% 
0603.11.00: Sweetheart, Spray and other Roses, fresh cut 70 635 6.8% 
1604.14.30: Tunas and skipjack, not in oil, in airtight containers, over quota 70 067 12.5% 
2710.19.05: Distillate and residual fuel oil derived from petroleum or oils  31 085 0.1% 
0710.80.97: Vegetables, frozen, reduced in size 20 909 14.9% 
0804.30.40: Pineapples, fresh or dried, not reduced in size 12 106 2.5% 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the United 
States International Trade Commission.  
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Note that some product descriptions are abbreviated for reasons of space. The tariff rates shown for petroleum and 
derivatives, and also for pineapples, are ad valorem equivalents based on average prices for non-preferential United 
States imports in 2008. 
 
4. The negotiation of new or interconnected FTAs 
Do the pending FTAs with Colombia, Panama and the Republic of Korea represent the last in a series 
of recent FTAs, or will the Obama administration negotiate new agreements? If the answer to this 
question were to be based solely on the themes of the 2008 presidential election, it would appear to be 
an emphatic "no". Now that the administration has taken office, however, there are growing signs that 
it may see value in additional FTAs. 
One such sign came in a policy address delivered by the USTR, Ron Kirk, on 23 April 2009. 
Without further elaboration, he stated that, "When it's time to strike new trade deals, we'll seek bigger 
ones that access major markets for American workers, fa mers, ranchers, manufacturers, and service 
providers."20 This statement seems to imply that the current administration will negotiate new trade 
agreements, although the timing is left open. It also appears to be in line with congressional criticism of 
the FTAs negotiated under the Bush administration, t  the effect that these were driven more by 
diplomatic goals than commercial imperatives. If and when the current administration proposes new 
FTAs, it is thus more likely to target larger trading partners that offer greater potential for increasing 
exports. That would suggest looking outside the western hemisphere. 
The United States could pursue simplification of rules of origin, pooling of origin or co-
production arrangements among its FTA partners. 
Another possibility is to negotiate a new arrangement among the existing FTA partners in order 
to meld these agreements together. Within the Americas, this approach could provide an opportunity to 
move from a "hub and spoke" model, in which the United States has numerous but separate FTAs, to 
one in which the many different agreements are ration l zed. One of the chief tasks for such a 
negotiation would be to harmonize the diverse rules of origin among the different agreements, to 
encourage regional co-production and reduce the complexity of regional operations.21 The talks being 
held between the United States and its FTA partners i  the framework of the Pathways to Prosperity in 
the Americas Initiative could also lead to some arrangement whereby the rules of origin among these 
various agreements are modified to allow for simplification or pooling of origin and co-production 
arrangements. 
USTR takes cautious steps towards trans-Pacific trade cooperation 
While there are as yet no firm proposals for such negotiations between the United States and its FTA 
partners in Latin America and the Caribbean, there is a more geographically diverse initiative that 
could set a precedent. The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP, formerly 
known as P4) dating from 2005 currently encompasses Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and 
Singapore; and negotiations for the United States to join the Agreement were announced in September 
2008. The scope of these talks expanded in the transi io  period between the November, 2008 election 
and the inauguration of President Obama in January 2009, and USTR informed Congress in December 
2008 that Australia, Peru and Viet Nam would also participate in the negotiations. Nonetheless, the 
first round of negotiations, scheduled for March 2009, was postponed to allow the new United States 
administration time to conduct a general review of United States trade policy. 
It is not yet certain whether or in what form the TPP initiative will proceed. In May 2009 reports 
in the New Zealand press suggested that President Obama had commented favourably on the initiative 
in a discussion with Prime Minister John Key. USTR Kirk has also made some tentative but positive 
statements about the matter. Assuming that the Obama dministration does announce its desire to 
                                                   
20 See [online] http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2009/april/remarks-ambassador-ron-kirk-georgetown-univers. 
21 For a discussion of related issues see Antoni Estevadeordal and Kati Suominen (2009). 
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proceed with negotiations, they could take several different forms. The most difficult question may be 
whether Viet Nam should be invited to negotiate full FTA status, which could be problematic since it is 
now a major supplier of apparel to the United States. Even if the negotiations were limited to an effort 
to coordinate the United States' existing FTAs with Australia, Chile, Peru and Singapore, however, they
could set an important precedent for further melding of FTAs that are already operating. 
5. Prospects for renewed trade relations with Cuba 
Cuba is the only western hemisphere country that does not enjoy any form of preferential access to the 
United States market, and in fact is subject to sanctio s that prohibit most trade with the United States. 
The Obama administration has signalled its interest in relaxing or even lifting the sanctions that remain 
in place, and it has taken limited steps in that direct on. Further liberalization will depend on 
developments in Cuba and on political constraints wi hin the United States. 
TABLE 7 
UNITED STATES: EXPORTS TO CUBA, 2000-2008 
(Domestic exports, f.a.s., millions of dollars) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Agricultural products 0.0 2.3 70.7 114.7 155.0 148.6 163.3 224.1 408.7 
Food and related 
products 
0.0 1.7 66.5 132.9 222.5 186.5 164.3 192.8 259.8 
Beverages and 
tobacco 
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 1.2 0.0 13.6 21.6 
All other 6.7 2.8 6.8 11.0 21.6 25.2 19.9 16.5 27.5 
Total 6.7 6.9 144.1 258.9 399.3 361.4 347.5 447.0 717.7 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of 
figures from the United States International Trade Commission. 
 
 
The restrictions on economic relations between the United States and Cuba have evolved over 
the decades, sometimes tightening and sometimes loosening. Those shifts have variously responded to 
changes in the strategic environment, as well as a continuing struggle between groups in the United 
States that oppose trade with Cuba on political grounds and those that favour it for economic reasons 
(for example, the agriculture sector and the travel industry). The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export 
Enhancement Act of 2000 removed some export restrictions, but none of the import bans, by allowing 
the sale of agricultural goods and medicine to Cuba. Table 7 depicts the gradual growth of United 
States exports to Cuba in the years since the export restrictions were eased. As of 2008, Cuba was the 
seventh-largest market in the region for United States exports of agricultural products. 
President Obama signed an Act easing restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba. 
During his candidacy, President Obama stated that he would consider easing the embargo on 
Cuba. Since taking office, he has taken a step in this direction by signing into law, on 11 March 2009, 
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009. Section 621 of this legislation effectively ends the 











FIGURE 8  
UNITED STATES: PUBLIC OPINION IN FAVOUR OF CERTAIN 
ACTIONS REGARDING RELATIONS WITH CUBA 





Establish diplomatic relations End the trade embargo End travel restrictions 
 
Source: Washington Post, "News Poll" [online] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wprv/politics/polls/ 
postpoll_042609.html, 21-24 April 2009. 
 
 
There are several legislative proposals that the administration could support, should it wish to 
move in this direction,22 particularly those introduced by the chairs of therade committees in the 
House and Senate.23 
The chances of enacting such legislation will depend partly on political developments within 
Cuba and the overall state of relations between that country and the United States. It will also depend 
on the ongoing struggle between the pro- and anti-embargo forces within the United States. The survey 
findings shown in figure 8 suggest that United States public opinion has been gradually moving in the 
anti-embargo direction. There is also evidence to suggest that the same trends are at work among the 
Cuban exile community: one recent survey showed that while 42% of Cuban-Americans wanted the 
embargo to continue, 43% wanted to see it end (Bendix  and Associates, 2009). These results suggest 
that, should the Obama administration decide to make further moves towards normalizing political and 
economic relations with Cuba, it might face only limited opposition. 
                                                   
22 The Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Charles Rangel (Democrat-New York), has introduce three bills on the 
subject. One (H.R.1528), which has ten co-sponsors, would lift the travel ban. Rangel's second bill (H.R.1530) would lift the trade 
embargo altogether; this bill has nine co-sponsors. His third bill (H.R.1531), also with nine co-sponsr , among other things would 
remove impediments to the export of medical devices and medicines to Cuba, allow travel to Cuba by United States legal residents, 
and establish an agricultural export promotion programme with respect to Cuba. Chairman Max Baucus (Democrat-Montana) of the 
Senate Finance Committee is the counterpart to Chairman Rangel in the Senate. He is the chief sponsor of a bill (S.1089) which inter 
alia facilitates the export of agricultural commodities and products, establishes an agricultural export pr motion programme, removes 
impediments to the export of medical devices and meicines to Cuba, allows travel to Cuba, and establishes an agricultural export 
promotion programme. That bill has 16 co-sponsors. Other bills sponsored by various legislators include H.R.874 allowing travel 
between the United States and Cuba; H.R.1737 facilitating the sale of agricultural products to Cuba; H.R.2272 lifting the trade 
embargo, and S.428 allowing travel between the United States and Cuba. 
23 The number of legislators who choose to co-sponsor a bill is an indicator of the seriousness of support for a proposal. The same may 
be said for the level of the sponsors (committee chairmen and other high-ranking legislators have more influence) and the diversity of 
legislators (bipartisan sponsorship is considered a good sign). 
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B. The broader hemispheric agenda 
Regional trade negotiations centred on the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project were the 
principal driving force in inter-American cooperation for a decade. In recent years, however, the FTAA 
negotiations encountered increasing difficulties, and were eventually ended. The only reference to trade 
in the Declaration signed by the Heads of State and Government at the Fifth Summit of the Americas 
(Port of Spain, April 2009) came in a paragraph that observed, 
We recognize the positive contribution of trade among our nations to the promotion of growth, 
employment and development. We therefore continue to insist on an open, transparent and rules-
based multilateral trading system. We further recognize the need for all out peoples to benefit 
from the increased opportunities and welfare gains that the multilateral trading system 
generates.24 
The lack of a reference to FTAA constitutes an acknowledgment of its failure and a recognition 
that it would be impossible to resume the negotiatins in the current conditions. 
In the period 2003-2007 trade relations between the United States and its partners in the region were 
conducted primarily at the bilateral and subregional level, thereafter mainly through multilateral negotiations. 
Only the middle segment ―regional negotiations for a hemispheric agreement― has been set aside. 
Trade negotiations should no longer be viewed the engin  that drives the rest of hemispheric 
agenda: the abandonment of FTAA does not prevent hemispheric cooperation. 
On the broader hemispheric agenda, it is argued here t at the demise of FTAA should not mean 
that the United States, Latin America and the Caribbean need to abandon cooperative endeavours in 
their many other areas of common interest. It is true that some of the issues on the agenda are closely 
related to trade policy, such as energy security and financial regulation, and others are at least indirectly 
connected (such as workforce development and climate change). Yet, tacitly or explicitly linking them 
to trade negotiations may distort and delay the process of devising and funding specific programmes.  
This is not to say that there should be no role for summitry in trade policy. The recent meeting in 
April in Trinidad and Tobago offered two examples of how the Summit of the Americas may 
productively serve as an action-forcing event in the context of United States trade relations. Although 
the United States-Colombia FTA and the economic santions on Cuba were not formally a part of the 
agenda, the summit prompted the Obama administration to advance its review of the issues and to 
make at least tentative commitments.  
Nonetheless, trade might not be considered the chief topic for these meetings, at least for the 
foreseeable future. That issue is better handled in other forums for the time being, while summits focus 
on other issues on the hemispheric agenda. This can best be seen not as a complete decoupling of the 
agenda from trade, but a recommendation that trade negotiations no longer be viewed as the engine that 
drives everything else. There is ample scope for prductive trade cooperation between the United States 
and the Latin American and Caribbean region on issue  such as trade facilitation, aid for trade and the 
implementation of existing agreements, among others. The creation of hemispheric programmes to 




                                                   
24 See [online] http://www.summit-americas.org/V_Summit/decl_comm_pos_en.pdf. 
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